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EVIDENCE

-

FAIR TRIAL/FREE PRESS-ABSOLUTE

PRIVILEGE

AGAINST DISCLOSURE OF SOURCES OR EDITORIAL PROCESSES IN
LIBEL ACTION-No COUNTERVAILING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
NEWSPAPERMAN'S PRIVILEGE ACT. Maressa v. New
Jersey Monthly, 89 N.J. 176, 445 A.2d 376 (1982).
LIMITS

In Maressa v. New Jersey Monthly,' the New Jersey Supreme
Court held that the New Jersey Newspaperman's Privilege Act2 allows newspersons sued for libel to refuse to disclose the sources and
editorial processes that led to publication of the alleged libel.3 Further, the court found that a plaintiff seeking money damages in a
civil suit for defamation4 had no constitutional rights, under either
the United States Constitutions or the New Jersey Constitution, a
1. 89 N.J. 176, 445 A.2d 376 (1982).
2. The present version of the New Jersey Newspaperman's Privilege Act, N.J. STAT.
ANN. 2A:84-A-21 (West 1982) provides in pertinent part as follows:
Subject to Rule 37, a person engaged on, engaged in, connected with or employed by news media for the purpose of gathering, procuring, transmitting,
compiling, editing or disseminating news for the general public ... has a privilege to refuse to disclose, in any legal or quasi-legal proceeding or before any
investigative body . . [:]
a. The source, author, means, agency or person from or through whom
any information was procured, obtained, supplied, furnished, gathered, transmitted, compiled, edited, disseminated, or delivered; and
b. Any news or information obtained in the course of pursuing his professional activities, whether or not it is disseminated.
3. The court also held that protection under the Act is waived for only those specific
materials that are knowingly and voluntarily disclosed. Thus, partial disclosure or assertion of
affirmative defenses does not constitute a waiver. Maressa v. New Jersey Monthly, 89 N.J.
176, 194, 445 A.2d 376, 386 (1982).
4. Criminal trials, grand jury proceedings and civil suits are the three broad areas in
which the question of news media privilege has arisen. The outcomes in each area have varied
greatly. See generally Comment, Shield Laws: The Legislative Response to Journalistic Privilege, 26 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 453, 454-57 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Shield Laws].
5. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 702 (1976), mandated that "[rieputation alone, apart
from some more tangible interest such as employment, was neither 'liberty' nor 'property' by
...
See also
itself sufficient to invoke the procedural protection of the due process clause.
Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1980); Mazzella v. Philadelphia
Newspapers, 479 F. Supp. 523 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
6. Justice Schreiber, in his dissenting opinion, argued that art. 1, 1 6 of the New Jersey
Constitution provides a constitutional basis for a defamation action. Maressa v. New Jersey
Monthly, 89 N.J. 176, 202, 445 A.2d 376, 390 (1982) (Schreiber, J., dissenting). The pertinent constitutional provision follows:
Every person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects,
being responsible for the abuse of that right. . . .In all prosecutions or indictments for libel, the truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall
appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true, and was published
with good motives and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted; and the
jury shall have the right to determine the law and the fact.

that would limit the newsperson's privilege. By granting an absolute
privilege of nondisclosure to defendant newspersons, Maressa, for
the first time, raises troubling questions about a plaintiff's ability to

maintain a cause of action for libel. 7
In October 1979, the New Jersey Monthly magazine published
an article entitled Rating the Legislature. The article discussed several categories of state representatives including "The Best," "The
Worst" and "The Drones." 8 The plaintiff, Senator Joseph Maressa,
appeared under "The Worst" category.9 Describing Maressa as "callous, stupid, and just plain devious," the article's authors listed several incidents upon which they based the Senator's low rating.1 0 The
article concluded, "Maressa's problem is not so much that he is evil
as that he is sneaky, self-interested, and basically unprincipled.""1

Maressa filed a libel action in the New Jersey Superior Court,
Law Division, alleging that the defendants's had published defamatory falsehoods without making reasonable inquiries as to their accuracy and thereby had defamed him in reckless disregard of the
truth. 13 During pretrial discovery proceedings, the plaintiff sought a

broad range of information" which the defendants, claiming that the
information was privileged, refused to supply. The plaintiff sought
and the trial court granted an order compelling a more specific answer. The appellate division granted the defendants leave to appeal
the disclosure order, but the New Jersey Supreme Court directly
N.J. CONST. art. 1, 6 (emphasis added).
7. Since the landmark case of New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), a
public figure must show that the libel defendant acted with "actual malice" in publishing the
defamatory material. Actual malice was defined as knowing falsity or reckless disregard for
the truth. Id. at 287. A defendant possesses a reckless disregard for the truth when he, in fact,
entertains serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S.
727, 731 (1968). The recklessness may be inferred if "there are obvious reasons to doubt the
veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports." Id. at 732. See Comment, NewsSource Privilege in Libel Cases: A Critical Analysis, 57 WASi. L. REV. 349, 350-51 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as News-Source Privilege].
8. Maressa v. New Jersey Monthly, 89 N.J. at 182, 445 A.2d at 379.
9. Id. The plaintiff was described as a "floundering and ineffectual" man whose shortcomings went unnoticed by scores of extremists who, "appealing to Maressa's considerable
ego, managed to enlist him as their advocate this term." Id.
10. The article claimed that during a senate debate of the death penalty, Maressa
whined and attempted to cut off debate, that he smuggled an anti-gay lobbyist on to the senate
floor and then told the sergeant at arms that the lobbyist was his aide, that he was called
before the Legislative Ethics Committee and that he was "shot down" by the Supreme Court
Advisory Committee. Id.
11. id.
12. Suit was brought against the magazine's owner, publisher and editor-in-chief and
against the three reporters who wrote the article. Id. at 182, 445 A.2d at 379.
13. Maressa conceded that he is a public figure who must meet the New York Times
standard of proof to recover damages for libel. Id. at 183 n.1, 445 A.2d at 379 n.l. See supra
note 7 and accompanying text.
14. Through interrogatories and depositions the plaintiff sought the names and addresses
of all sources interviewed, as well as copies of all rough drafts, notes, questions and memoranda pertaining to the article. Id. at 183, 445 A.2d at 380.

certified the matter on its own motion before the appeal was heard.
Maressa v. New Jersey Monthly draws into conflict two fundamental interests that often have competed in the past.15 These interests are the policy of allowing the press unfettered access to sources
of information1 6 and the judicial goal of assuring free access to testi1
mony and relevant information essential to a search for the truth. 7
Although American courts at common law have long recognized
certain testimonial privileges,18 those courts historically have rejected claims for protection of confidential news sources and editorial
processes. 19 The rules of evidence strongly favor the principle that
every competent person is required to testify, 0 and courts traditionally have regarded exceptions to this doctrine with disfavor." Nevertheless, the controversy surrounding an evidentiary privilege for journalists has continued, and some states, including New Jersey, have
chosen to address
the problem through legislative enactments of
"shield laws. ' 22
New Jersey first enacted a newspaperman's privilege statute in
1933,28 and its courts have followed the general trend of strict con15. The duty of a witness to testify in courts of law has roots as deep in history as does
the guarantee of freedom of the press. Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 548 (2d Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 79 U.S. 237 (1958).

16. Freedom of the press has been recognized as an essential element of a democratic
government. This concept was expressed by James Madison in his classic statement that "[a]
popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy, or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance. And
a people who mean to be their own Governors must arm themselves with the power which
knowledge gives." Letter from James Madison to W. T. Barry (August 4, 1822), reprinted in
NINE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (G. Hunt ed. 1910).
17. "The right to sue and defend in court is the alternative of force. In an organized
society it is the right conservative of all other rights, and lies at the foundation of orderly
government." Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907). See generally 8
J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2190-2191 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (outlining the development
and history of testimonial compulsion in English law) [hereinafter cited as 8 J. WIGMORE].
18. Common law privileges include those protecting attorney-client and husband-wife
relationships. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 78-105 (2d ed. 1972).
19. See, e.g., In re Grunow, 84 N.J.L. 23S, 85 A. 1011 (1913); People ex rel. Mooney v.
Sheriff, 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 415 (1936); see generally Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 591 (1966)
(discussing the privilege of a newspaper or magazine and persons connected therewith not to
disclose communications to or information acquired by such a person).
20. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 17.
21. Wigmore favors no testimonial privilege against disclosure of communications and
would allow such a privilege only if the following four prerequisites are met:
(1) The communications must originate in confidence; and (2) the element of
confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the
relationship between the parties; and (3) the relationship must be worthy of
community protection; and (4) injury resulting from disclosure must be greater
than the benefit gained from correct disposal of litigation.
Id. at § 2285.
22. Statutes recognizing a newsperson's privilege are popularly referred to as shield
laws. Twenty-six states have enacted shield laws including: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Tennessee. Shield Laws, supra note 4, at 466 n.83.
23. The 1933 statute provided as follows: "No person engaged in, connected with or

struction.' 4 The holding in Maressa, however, represents a significant departure from precedent. 5
The Supreme Court of New Jersey considered its shield law", in
a libel case for the first time in Brogan v. Passaic Daily News.2 7 In
Brogan, the defendants28 asserted that they were protected from disclosing their source of information for an allegedly libelous article by
the New Jersey Shield Law" and that the common law defense of
fair comment and good faith"0 barred the plaintiff's recovery.
The court held that the shield law should not be construed to
permit defendants either to give or to withhold information when
their own acts have raised a question of their liability to others."1
The court recognized that permitting defendants to exercise such
discretion effectively would deny punitive damages to a plaintiff in a
suit for libel. 8 ' The court further held that the defendant editor had
waived his privilege against disclosure by testifying that he had
based his information upon a reliable source and by revealing the
substance of his information.88 The court's rationale indicated that if
a newspaper may libel, defend by stating that the information came
from a reliable source, and then bar further inquiry into the source
by pleading the statutory privilege, recovery would be denied in
most, if not all, cases.' Essentially, the plaintiff would be precluded
from obtaining favorable information to combat the defenses of good
employed on any newspaper shall be compelled to disclose, in any legal proceeding ...,the
source of any information procured or obtained by him and published in the newspaper on
which he is engaged, connected with or employed." 1933 N.J. LAWS, ch. 167, §§ 1, 2 (codified
in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2:97-11) (repealed 1960).
24. Comment, Journalist Privilege: In re Farber and the New Jersey Shield Law, 32
RUTGERS L. REV. 545, 550 (1979).
25. See, e.g., Central N.J. Jewish Home for the Aged v. New York Times Co., 183 N.J.
Super. 445, 444 A.2d 80 (1981); Resorts Int'l, Inc. v. New Jersey Monthly, 180 N.J. Super.
459, 433 A.2d 778 (1981). See also supra note 20 and infra note 104.
26. The shield law construed in Brogan was repealed in 1960. See supra note 2 and 23.
27. 22 N.J. 139, 123 A.2d 473 (1956). The New Jersey Superior Court thirteen years
earlier had considered the statute's application to a grand jury proceeding in State v. Donovan,
129 N.J.L. 478, 30 A.2d 421 (1943). The Court held that the managing editor of the Jersey
Journal was required to answer questions regarding an article alleging criminal conduct by
Hudson County authorities.
28. The action was brought against both the newspaper's publisher and its managing
editor. 22 N.J. 139, 145, 123 A.2d 473, 476 (1956).
29. See supra notes 23 and 26.
30. 22 N.J. 139, 146, 123 A.2d 473, 476-77.
31. Id. at 152, 123 A.2d at 480.
32. At the time Brogan was decided, a libel plaintiff had to demonstrate only that the
published information was untrue and that it had damaged her reputation in the community.
See News-Source Privilege, supra note 7, at 350. Once this burden was met, a plaintiff was
entitled to recover compensatory damages. A showing of malice or ill will was required for
recovery of punitive damages. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 112 at 751-54 (4th ed.
1971). Since 1964, however, the first amendment has been interpreted as requiring a showing
of actual malice (knowing falsity or reckless disregard for the truth). New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
33. Brogan v. Passaic Daily News, 22 N.J. 139, 151, 123 A.2d 473, 481 (1956).
34. Id. at 152, 123 A.2d at 480.

faith, fair comment and lack of malice."
In response to Brogan, the New Jersey Legislature amended the
shield laws and specifically noted that only disclosure of privileged
material, consent to disclosure, or a contract not to claim the privilege would constitute a waiver of the privilege.37 Despite the new
legislation, the New Jersey Superior Court found Brogan to be controlling in Beecroft v. Point Pleasant Printing & Publishing Co."
The plaintiff in Beecroft sought damages caused by publication of an
allegedly defamatory editorial in defendant's newspaper. The editorial stated that the plaintiff had performed his duties as chief of police in an unlawful, partial and dictatorial manner, without regard
for the rights of the public and in violation of his oath of office. a'
The court held that a newsperson, who alleged the defenses of fair
comment, good faith and reasonable belief in the truth of an allegedly libelous editorial, had waived the statutory privilege of refusing
to divulge his sources of information. 0
Both Brogan and Beecroft were decided before the landmark
libel case of New York Times v. Sullivan."' Currently, under the
law, a public figure42 must prove actual malice43 to recover not only
35. Id.
36. See supra notes 2 and 23.
37. Rule 37, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-29 (1976) defines the conditions under which a
journalist will be held to have waived his or her statutory privilege as follows:
A person waives his right or privilege to refuse to disclose or to prevent another
from disclosing a specified matter if he or any other person while the holder
thereof has (a) contracted with anyone not to claim the right or privilege, or, (b)
without coercion and with knowledge of his right or privilege, made disclosure of
any part of the privileged matter or consented to such a disclosure made by
anyone.
A disclosure which is itself privileged or otherwise protected by the common
law, statutes, or rules of court of this State, or by lawful contract, shall not
constitute a waiver under this section. The failure of a witness to claim a right or
privilege with respect to one question shall not operate as a waiver with respect
to any other question.
38. 82 N.J. Super. 269, 197 A.2d 416 (1964).
39. Id. at 271, 197 A.2d at 417. The defendant moved to strike several interrogatories
propounded by the plaintiff that asked for information and the source of the information on
which the allegedly defamatory news editorial was based. Id. at 271, 197 A.2d at 417.
40. The court noted that the only material change in the newly enacted statute was the
word "source," which was expanded to include "source, author, means, agency or person." Id.
at 276, 197 A.2d at 419. Finding that this change was made to circumvent the decision in
State v. Donovan, 129 N.J.L. 478, 30 A.2d 421 (1943) (grand jury proceeding), the court held
that, even by implication, the statutory language could not be enlarged to encompass the situation in Beecroft. See supra note 27.
41. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See supra note 7.
42. There are two categories of public figures. The first category includes those who
occupy positions of "such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures
for all purposes." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974). The second category
consists of "limited" public figures. Limited public figures are those persons who voluntarily
have "thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence
the resolution of the issues involved." Id. See Wolston v. Readers Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157
(1979); Hutchinson v. Pro:xmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
43. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.

punitive damages, but any damages at all. Thus, the conclusion
reached in Brogan and Beecroft, that the New Jersey Shield Law
must yield in certain situations, is even more compelling today. At
stake is the survival of the libel cause of action itself."" The New
York Times v. Sullivan Court recognized a qualified first amendment right in news gathering and dissemination 4 and intended to
afford greater protection to "those who would give voice to public
criticism."'46 After New York Times, the defendant newsperson
would appear to need less protection under a state shield law, while
the libel plaintiff would seem to have a more compelling need for
disclosure of sources and editorial processes.
Finally, in the 1972 case of Branzburg v. Hayes,47 the United
States Supreme Court addressed the issue of news-source protec-

tion.' 8 Justice White, speaking for a majority of five, 49 declined to
grant journalists an evidentiary privilege to withhold the identities of
confidential news sources when testifying before grand juries.5 0 Al-

though nine Justices recognized that a journalist's cultivation of confidential sources is a form of newsgathering that deserves protection, 51 the majority concluded that the public interest in law
enforcement and effective grand jury proceedings outweighed any
44. See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 170 (1979), in which Justice White commented on the far-reaching effects of precluding a plaintiff from discovering editorial
processes.
45. 376 U.S. 254, 278.
46. Id. at 279. The court reasoned that punishing all error resulting from exercise of
first amendment rights induces suppression of truthful information and therefore is intolerable.
47. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). Branzburg was a consolidation of four cases. Two of the cases,
Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1970), and Branzburg v. Meigs, 503 S.W.2d 748
(Ky. 1971) involved Louisville Courier Journal reported Paul Branzburg. The earlier case
arose after Branzburg had written a story on his observations of two unnamed youths synthesizing hashish from marijuana. The latter case arose out of a story that provided a comprehensive survey of the local "drug scene." In both instances the court of appeals ruled that
Branzburg had no privilege to refuse to answer questions about his stories before a grand jury.
The third case, In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971), involved a television
reporter who had been allowed to remain at Black Panther Headquarters. The Supreme Court
of Massachusetts rejected his attempt to quash a grand jury summons on first amendment
grounds. The final case, Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), concerned a
New York Times reporter assigned to cover the Black Panthers and other militant groups.
When the reporter, Caldwell, refused to appear before the grand jury that was investigating
the Panthers, the court ordered him jailed for contempt. The Ninth Circuit reversed the order,
citing a qualified first amendment privilege.
48. The United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the constitutionality of shield
laws. In re Bridge, 120 N.J. Super. 460, 466, 295 A.2d 3, 6 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 911
(1973). See Shield Laws, supra note 4, at 470.
49. Justice White authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist joined. Justice Stewart filed a dissenting opinion. in
which Justices Brennan and Marshall joined. Justice Douglas filed a separate dissenting
opinion.
50. 408 U.S. at 690.
51. Justice White wrote that "without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom
of the press could be eviscerated." Id. at 681. Justice Douglas, dissenting, noted that "confidential relationships . . . are indispensable to their [journalists'] work of gathering, analyzing,
and publishing the news." Id. at 711-12 (Douglas, J.,dissenting).

burden on reporters that might result from disclosure. 2
Branzburg left undecided the issue of whether first amendment
values underlying protection of news sources should be subordinate
to interests other than law enforcement.58 Most courts have interpreted Branzburg as recognizing a qualified first amendment privilege in newspersons and have advocated a case-by-case balancing approach with other conflicting interests.54
Three months after the Supreme Court's Branzburg decision,
the New Jersey Superior Court in In re Bridge" interpreted
Branzburg as a rejection of both a constitutionally based privilege
and a case-by-case balancing approach.' 6 The court refused to grant
a first amendment testimonial privilege to reporter Peter Bridge57
and further found that he was not protected under the New Jersey
Shield Law because his disclosure of part of the requested information was a waiver of the privilege."
As a direct response to Bridge, the New Jersey Legislature
again amended the state's shield law, in an attempt to protect a reporter who encounters the circumstances presented in Bridge.' The
amended statute provided that a reporter could refuse to disclose
both the name of a source and any information provided by a source,
whether the information was published or not. Disclosure of the
identity of the informant would not waive the rest of the privilege. In
addition, the legislature extended the coverage of the shield law to
52. Id. at 690-91.
53. See Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing Qualified Privilege for Newsmen, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 709, 743 (1975).

54. Nearly all courts have settled on a three part test that allows a plaintiff to overcome
a defendant's qualified constitutional privilege. A plaintiff must show the following:
1. The information is relevant to prove critical elements of the cause of action;
and
2. The claim is meritorious or not frivolous; and
3. There is no other way of obtaining the information.
See, e.g., Miller v. Transamerican Press, 621 F.2d 721, 726 (5th Cir. 1980); Silkwood v. KerrMcGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 436-37 (10th Cir. 1977); DeRoburt v. Gannett, Inc., 507 F.Supp.
880, 886 (D. Hawaii, 1981); Senear v. Daily Journal-American, 97 Wash. 2d 148, 155, 641
P.2d 1180, 1183 (1982); Gagnon v. City of Fremont, 632 P.2d 567, 569 (Colo. 1981). But see
Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 992 (8th Cir. 1972); Dow Jones & Co. v. Superior Ct.,
364 Mass. 317, 320, 303 N.E.2d 847, 849 (1973); In re Bridge, 120 N.J. Super. 460, 467, 295
A.2d 3, 6 (1972), certif denied, 62 N.J. 80, 299 A.2d 78 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 991
(1973). The United States Supreme Court did not rule on this issue as it relates to a defamation plaintiff until seven years after Branzburg. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979);
see also infra note 68 and accompanying text.
55. 120 N.J. Super. 460, 295 A.2d 3 (1972), certif. denied, 62 N.J. 80, 299 A.2d 78
(1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 991 (1973).
56. Id. at 467-68, 295 A.2d at 6.
57. Id.

58. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. The shield law allowed a reporter to
refuse to disclose the source of published matter. Bridge argued that the word "source" protected both the identity of the informant and the unpublished information and that disclosure
of the former did not affect the right to confidentiality of the latter. In re Bridge, 120 N.J.
Super. at 466, 295 A.2d at 5-6.
59. The legislature amended the statute in 1977. See supra notes 2, 23 and 37.

all members of the news media in all legal or quasi-legal
proceedings.
In re Farber60 represents the court's first test of the 1977 shield
law amendment.' The New Jersey Supreme Court recognized that
the shield law provided Farber and the New York Times with a testimonial privilege,62 which the legislature intended to be as broad as3
possible within the context of the state and federal constitutions.
The court concluded, however, that because confidential information
was relevant to a murder trial, the criminal defendant's constitutional right to compulsory process64 prevailed over Farber's shield
law privilege.68
Both Farber and Branzburg involved interpretations of a journalist's privilege in situations other than a civil suit for libel. In
1979, the United States Supreme Court rendered its first opinion
concerning discovery in defamation cases. In Herbert v. Lando the
Court held that a journalist in a defamation action did not have an
absolute privilege to block discovery of the editorial process that resulted in an allegedly defamatory report about a public figure. The
plaintiff in Herbert, a retired army officer, commenced a defamation
action against Columbia Broadcasting System for suggesting that he
had lied in a television report in which he claimed that superior officers had covered up war crimes. During discovery the plaintiff deposed the producer of the report and inquired about his state of mind
during the editorial process to discover evidence of recklessness to
satisfy the New York Times standard. The reporter refused to disclose the requested information on first amendment grounds.
The Herbert Court reasoned that any editorial privilege, qualified or absolute, would impose too great a burden on a plaintiff's
ability to prove actual malice under the New York Times standard.'
Since the plaintiff must prove that the defendant had a "subjective
60. 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied sub nom., 439 U.S. 997 (1978). The New
Jersey Supreme Court upheld criminal and civil contempt judgments entered against the defendants, the New York Times and reporter Myron Farber. These judgments resulted from the
defendants' failure to comply with two subpoenas duces tecum directing them to produce certain materials gathered during an investigation of the murder trial of Dr. Mario Jascalevich.
Id. at 264, 394 A.2d at 332.
61. See supra notes 2 and 23.
62. 78 N.J. at 270-71, 394 A.2d at 335.
63. Id. at 270, 394 A.2d at 335.
all criminal prosecutions the accused
64. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides that "[i]n
shall enjoy the right . . . to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." See
also N.J. CONST. art. I, 1 10.
65. 78 N.J. at 272, 394 A.2d at 339-40.
66. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
67. Id. at 156.
68. . Id. at 170. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. In his dissent, Justice Brennan
proposed a qualified editorial privilege for journalists, allowing discovery into editorial thought
processes only after a prima facie showing of defamatory falsehood. 441 U.S. at 197-98 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

awareness of probable falsity,"'6 the Court concluded that an editorial privilege barring discovery into the journalist's thought processes
would foreclose the plaintiff's ability to prove his case.
7
Maressa v. New Jersey Monthly70 represents the first time 1
that the New Jersey Supreme Court has addressed the issue of the
extent to which the current shield law 7 2 protects the news media
from disclosure of sources and editorial processes in libel actions.
The holding in Maressa73 is based on the court's finding that the
legislature, by amending the shield law twice in recent years, 7 intended to provide comprehensive protection for all aspects of news
gathering and dissemination.7 5 This conclusion emanated from the
holding in In re Farber, in which the court stated: "[w]e read the
legislative intent in adopting the statute in its present form as seeking to protect the confidential sources of the press

. . .

to the great-

est extent permitted by the Constitution of the United States and
1
that of the State of New Jersey.
Nevertheless, the Maressa court distinguished Farberand found
Farber not dispositive because Farber dealt with a criminal defen78
dant's right to compel witnesses to testify and to produce evidence
and thus raised constitutional issues absent in a civil suit for defamation. Justice Pashman wrote for the majority and declared that defamation, being entirely a matter of state law, enjoyed no constitutional protection. 79 Although the court acknowledged the importance
of a defamation claim,80 the majority found no right to maintain a
defamation action in either the Constitution of the United States or
of New Jersey.81
69. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 334 n.6 (1974).
70. 89 N.J, 176, 445 A.2d 376 (1982).
71. The issue had been considered by the New Jersey Superior Court just prior to the
Maressa decision in the cases of Central N.J. Jewish Home v. New York Times, 183 N.J.
Super. 445, 444 A.2d 80 (1981), and Resorts Int'l Inc. v. New Jersey Monthly, 180 N.J.
Super. 459, 433 A.2d 778 (1981). See also infra note 98.
72. See supra note 2.
73. Absent any overriding constitutional interests, the newsperson's privilege against disclosure is absolute. 89 N.J. 176, 189, 445 A.2d 376, 382.
74. See supra notes 2 and 23 and accompanying text.
75. 89 N.J. 176, 186, 445 A.2d 376, 382.
76. 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied sub nom., 39 U.S. 997 (1978). See supra
note 61 and accompanying text.
77. Id. at 270, 394 A.2d at 335.
78. This is a constitutionally guaranteed right. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; N.J. CONST.
art. I,T 10. See supra note 64.
79. 89 N.J. 176, 191, 445 A.2d 376, 384. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
80. Id. at 190, 445 A.2d at 383. See, e.g., Rainier's Dairies v. Raritan Valley Farms, 19
N.J. 552, 557, 117 A.2d 889, 891 (1955), in which the court stated that defamation "embodies
the important public policy that individuals and business entities should generally be free to
enjoy their reputations unimpaired by false and defamatory attacks." See generally W. PROSSR, LAW OF TORTS, § Ill at 739 (4th ed. 1971).
81. The court rejected the plaintiff's contention that to deny discovery of material potentially crucial to his claim is a violation of due process. 89 N.J. at 193, 445 A.2d at 385.

In a lone dissent, Justice Schreiber argued that Article I, paragraph 6 of the New Jersey Constitution safeguards an individual's
right to a cause of action for defamation."2 The dissent recognized
that certain limitations to a defamation action exist under the
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the first amendment.88 Nonetheless Justice Schrieber stated that the New Jersey
Legislature could not pass laws that would further limit or possibly
eliminate a public figure's defamation cause of action.
The majority, however, found no constitutional limitations on
the shield law in a libel situation84 and held that the plaintiff's motion to compel discovery of sources and editorial processes must fail
unless the defendants had waived their privilege. 85 The court disposed of this issue by interpreting recent changes in the shield law
and increased constitutional protection of libel defendants since Brogan" as indicating that partial disclosure or assertion of affirmative
defenses no longer should constitute a waiver of the shield law privilege. The court held that waiver under the shield law operates only
on those specific materials that are knowingly and voluntarily
disclosed. 7
The practical effect Maressa will have on libel plaintiffs attempting to meet the New York Times burden of proof is apparent.
As Justice Schrieber stated, "[in most cases a plaintiff's ability to
develop evidence relative to the state of mind of the defendant will
have been eliminated and . . . his . . . cause of action will have

been obliterated." 8 Such an effect had been noted earlier in Herbert
v. Lando by both Justice White 9 in his majority opinion and by Justice Brennan in his dissenting opinion. 90 The major problem with
finding an absolute privilege of nondisclosure in the shield law is
simply that "it [is] anomalous to turn substantive liability on a journalist's subjective attitude and at the same time shield from disclos82. 89 N.J. 176, 202, 445 A.2d 376, 390 (Schreiber, J., dissenting). See supra note 6
and accompanying text.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 194, 445 A.2d at 385-86.
85. The plaintiff, relying on Brogan v. Passaic Daily News, argued that the defendants
waived their privilege by partial disclosure and by assertion of affirmative defenses including
truth, fair comment, good faith, honest belief and lack of malice. 89 N.J. 176, 194, 445 A.2d

376, 386. The court held that the 1977 amendments tightened the requirements for waiver.
See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 2, 7, 23, 32 and 37 and accompanying text.
87. 89 N.J. at 194, 445 A.2d at 386. The New Jersey Shield Law was amended again in
1979. The 1979 amendments apply only to discovery requests by criminal defendants. Nevertheless, the Maressa court interpreted the amendments as indicative of a legislative intent to
apply waiver principles to all proceedings. The 1979 amendments provide that "[plublication
shall constitute a waiver only as to the specific materials published." N.J. STAT. ANN.
2A:84A-21.3(b) (West 1982).
88. 89 N.J. at 209, 445 A.2d at 393 (Schreiber, J., dissenting).
89.

441 U.S. at 170.

90. Id. at 198.

ure the most direct evidence of that attitude."9 In Herbert, the
United States Supreme Court refused to reach the precise result
sanctioned by the court in Maressa, the elimination of a public
figure's cause of action for defamation.
The Maressa majority indicated that an absolute shield law
privilege does not foreclose entirely a prospective plaintiff's right to
maintain a cause of action.9 The rationale of this argument is that,
in some circumstances, public figures will be able to establish by inferential evidence the recklessness necessary to sustain a libel judgment. The court did not outline the circumstances that might make
this possible, but vaguely asserted that a defendant might choose to
reveal his or her sources to rebut an inferential showing of actual
malice. 93 This reasoning overlooks the fact that a rebuttal would not
be necessary unless the issue of actual malice goes to the jury, which
would not be possible if the plaintiff were foreclosed at the discovery
phase from obtaining evidence crucial to the establishment of a
cause of action.
While the majority recognized that its holding might be unfair,9 ' it is convinced that such a result is required by the legislative
intent behind the shield law. The court refused to weigh the conflicting interests and to assess the resultant hardships in holding the
shield law absolute, reasoning instead that the New Jersey Legislature already has done so by enacting the statute. The shield law theoretically represents the legislative determination that society's interest in a free press outweighs the possibility of damage to an
individual's reputation.9" According to the majority, defamation is a
common law action without a constitutional foundation; the legislature, therefore, has the power to eliminate that action to protect
freedom of the press.
Maressa v. New Jersey Monthly thus conflicts with the long
standing policy of construing testimonial privileges strictly" and
marks a major break with precedents of both the New Jersey
courts 97 and the United States Supreme Court. 98 Maressa had petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, 99
and the Court might take this opportunity to clarify both the consti91. Id. at 192.
92. 89 N.J. 176, 198, 445 A.2d 376, 388.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 200, 445 A.2d at 389.
95. Id.
96. "If there be any guide it is that the Legislature is aware of the principle that evidentiary privileges are not favored, precluding as they do a rational means for ascertaining the
truth." Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

97. See supra note 25.
98.
99.

See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
A Petition for a Writ of Certiorari was filed on July 28, 1982.

tutionality of shield laws and their appropriate impact on libel actions. Alternatively, the New Jersey Legislature may feel compelled
once again to amend the New Jersey Shield Law when the effect of
the Maressa court's interpretation on libel plaintiffs becomes apparent. Indeed the court appears to expect precisely that result. The
majority stated that "the balance we adopt can always be changed
by the Legislature." ' With the increasing impact of the news media on public perception, 10 1 it is more important than ever that this
issue be resolved in a manner that encourages an open but responsible press. One thought remains clear-a press immune from all legal
responsibility for defamatory publications is not likely to be a responsible press.

100. 89 N.J. at 192, 445 A.2d at 385.
101. Statistics indicate that 99.8% of the homes in America have radio and television.
United States Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States 795 (1978). This
widespread electronic communications network vests a relatively small group of people with
the ability to blanket the nation with statements within minutes that might cause serious injury to individual citizens.
[Casenote by Ann M. Caldwell].

